《纽约时报》文章:我的新疆亲戚眼中的暴乱 (ZT)

原编者按:去年拉萨暴乱之后,孙雁写了“一个四川家庭和西藏的未来”,2008年5月30日发表在《纽约时报》上,在美国引起很大反响。乌鲁木齐七五暴乱发生之后,《纽约时报》的编辑又联系孙雁,问她在新疆有没有亲戚。果然有。正在国内探亲的孙雁马上跟她在新疆的亲戚联系,写出了以下文章,2009年7月8日发表在《纽约时报》上。   自7月7日回到重庆老家,我便问母亲家里还有多少亲戚在新疆,他们近况又如何。母亲说有十个近亲的家庭及几位远房亲戚仍在新疆。尽管其中一些出生并成长在新疆,但大部分都是在六,七十年代从四川乡村迁过去的,目的是为了脱离农村而成为城里人。是一位在五十年代被分配到新疆的姨妈介绍他们去的,她自己的家庭则在八十年代迁返四川。   我打电话给他们,就新疆暴乱的问题坦诚交流,并告诉他们西方媒体认为日益增长的维汉民族分裂是暴乱的主要原因。西方媒体列举的原因使他们或惊奇或大笑。他们长期生活在边远贫穷地区,我没有理由与他们争论。作为一名社会科学学者,他们对暴乱为何发生的观点使我很感兴趣,毕竟,他们离暴乱的漩涡最近。   我的亲戚们认为他们与当地穆斯林之间存在着长期的友谊,因此他们想不出维汉间分歧会严重到引发暴乱的程度。相反,他们声称他们看到了外部势力的渗透,比如资金流向如地下清真寺那些言辞激烈的阿訇,流向制造爆炸物和炸弹的"恐怖分子团体",流向那些在街头寻衅闹事的无业维族青年。另外,他们还认为维吾尔分离主义势力在模仿藏族流亡者的策略,即用宗教自由,保护文化和语言传统,民族平等及区域自治等西方人熟悉的概念和话语来赢得同情和支持。   不正是这些方面有问题吗?我的亲戚们都认为国家政策已经很偏向维吾尔族了。宗教自由?亲戚们都觉得政府的一些限制政策无可厚非。如18岁以下不得入清真寺,这是因为未成年人还无法做出正确判断;拿政府工资的也应按政府要求不去清真寺。政府一般派一位官员(维族)每周与清真寺联系一次,但这也情有可原,因为正是官方的资金帮助建造了清真寺的维护和阿訇工资均来自政府拨款。难道维族人就不能自己掏钱?回答是:如果那样的话,境外的宗教力量就会出资给他们。难道没看见在巴基斯坦西部地区由于外部势力资助伊斯兰学校而导致恐怖活动频繁吗?   那在学校里强迫实施汉语教学是怎么回事?对我亲戚而言,他们还是第一次听说这个事。因为他们做学生时,维族人上用维语教学的维族学校,他们则是上汉族学校。一些维族人为了将来就业方便而上汉族学校。实际上,双语教育是2005年才开始在新疆的公立学校展开。因为人力资源的原因,大部分技术学院都采用汉语教学,,民族大学一直用少数民族语言教学。我的亲戚们不但不把双语教育视为强制同化,而认为这对找工作有利,因为在新疆自治区内外,同现代部门和经济联系,都需要用汉语。从他们个人角度而言,他们日常能说足够维语与维族人交流;甚至可以说他们的生活方式更像维族人,如他们更爱吃羊肉而非猪肉。   如何看待市场经济下汉族与维族穆斯林间不断扩大的收入差距的问题?我的亲戚们把原因归到汉族和维族对教育、成就感及生活的不同态度上。他们的观点也许有"种族歧视"之嫌。如他们认为维族的游牧民族传统使得他们不愿将孩子送入学校,而是让他们闲逛或是洗日光浴;维族人也不像汉族人那样追求事业上和物质上的成就,勤奋工作或长远计划。他们更注重精神世界的满足。这些正是我在西方社会科学中学到的前现代与现代、宗教与世俗,以及是否追求成就的价值观所在。对此我很难做出评判,只是希望汉族同胞能放松一点,像维族兄弟一样享受生活。   那汉族移民到维族的土地是不是挤压了维族人?这难道不算征服或者殖民吗?这些问题使我的亲戚们感到震惊。一位曾在南疆于阗教书三十年的舅妈给我上了一堂历史课:新疆地区在公元前200年的汉朝就已在中国的控制之下,只是内忧外患时,对新疆的控制才有所减弱。但清朝在18世纪下叶稳固了对新疆的控制。   各朝的统治者都宣称自己对新疆拥有控制权和主权。我另一位曾在四川阿坝工作过的姨妈称数千年来中国其实就是不同民族融合汇聚的大熔炉。我母亲回想起了她的白皮肤、黄头发的祖母,她很可能是来自中国西部的突厥裔。她们祖上也是从外域移民来川的。   那政府的政策是不是应为不断加剧的民族冲突负责?奇怪的是(对我这个熟悉美国的种族政治的学者来说并不奇怪),一些亲戚认为政府错误的少数民族优先政策增加了维族人的民族认同感与权利意识。他们说,有纪律问题或犯罪的维族人常常得到宽大处理。在公共部门的职位就职、任命及提拔上,他们觉得维族人常常比能力更强的汉族人获得优先。汉族人还抱怨在大学录取及人口政策上的"反向歧视"。汉人只能要一个小孩,而维族人如果在有三个小孩后停止生育的话,还可以得到政府的表扬及金钱奖励,每年还有额外奖金。不论这些看法是否正确,汉人的抱怨使得他们很难同情维族人的申诉。   那么世界维吾尔代表大会及其领导人热比亚是不是最近暴乱的幕后策划人?几位年长的亲戚想起了30年代及冷战时代维族分离势力受到苏联的教唆,他们因此说世维会或热比亚受到外来支持并不足为奇。年轻的亲戚则点出美国,不是说美国参与了暴乱,而是说这些人利用了美国对北京的所作所为的担忧和美国总是同情北京反对的人。在中国境内制造暴乱目的不过是为了在境外那些组织得以生存壮大下去。因此,他们估计这种暴乱今后还会层出不穷。 孙雁,四川人,1985年赴美,1992年至今为纽约城市大学政治学教授。点击这里查看英文原文。(英文简历:Professor Yan Sun received her degrees from Nanjing University, Beijing School of Foreign Affairs and the Johns Hopkins University. Her research interests include post-socialist political economy and transitional politics of China, East Asian development, and comparative economic transition of China, Russia and India. She is the author of The Chinese Reassessment of Socialism 1976-1992 (Princeton, 1995) and Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Cornell, 2004). She has also published in Comparative Politics, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Current History, Asian Survey, Crime, Law and Social Change, and others.) http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/what-should-china-do-about-the-uighurs/#yan My Han Relatives’ View From Xinjiang Yan Sun, a native of Sichuan, has lived in the United States since 1985 and been a professor of political science at the City University of New York since 1992. She has also written “A Sichuan Family and Tibet’s Future.” After arriving at the home of my parents in Chongqing on July 7, I asked my mother how many relatives we still had in Xinjiang and how they were doing lately. Ten families of close relatives, she said, and several more distant ones. Some were born and raised in Xinjiang, but the majority migrated there in the 1960s and 1970s from the Sichuan countryside. The sole reason was to get out of the poor farmland and have a chance at becoming urban residents. They were introduced to Xinjiang by an aunt who was assigned there in the 1950s but had managed to bring her family back to Sichuan in the 1980s. My relatives mostly see “outside forces” as the main reason for the latest as well as other riots in Xinjiang in recent years. I scrambled to reach some of them by phone and talk to them candidly about the issues that are often cited in the Western media as responsible for growing ethnic divide and tensions between the Uighur and Han Chinese. Some of my cited reasons took them by surprise; others made them laugh. With their decades of life and work in an austere region, I have little reason to dispute them. As a social scientist, it is fascinating for me to learn about their perspective on the deeper roots of the recent riots. After all, they were supposed to be the very source and targets of local grievance. Without any need to repeat government accounts to me, my relatives mostly see “outside forces” as the main reason for the latest as well as other riots in Xinjiang in recent years. Citing long-term good friendship with local Muslims, they are hard-pressed to think of divisions serious enough to cause deadly riots. Rather, they claim to have seen outside influences at work from their own experience, e.g., money for underground mosques where mullahs engage in inciting rhetoric, for “terrorist groups” that make explosives and bombs, or for restless Muslim youths who stage trouble on the streets. They also see a pattern of Uighur separatist forces imitating the tactics of Tibetan exiles, namely, phrasing issues in terms that appeal to Western sensibilities, such as religious freedom, cultural and linguistic preservation, ethnic equality or territorial autonomy. But aren’t there problems in these areas? My relatives were unanimous in their view that state policies are already tilted in favor of local ethnics. Freedom of religion? My relatives see the state restrictions are justifiable: no mosques for those under 18 because they are not mature enough to have good judgment, and no mosque attendance for those holding government jobs. The state does send an (Uighur) official as a liaison with the mosques on a weekly basis, but again this is seen as justifiable since the state funds helped with their construction and to pay the mullahs’ salaries. Why not let them fund on their own? The answer is that outside religious forces would otherwise fund them. Having read about how foreign-financed madrassahs spring up and spread in western Pakistan, I am hard-pressed to pass judgment here. How about the imposition of Chinese language instruction in schools? This was news to my relatives. They grew up attending separate schools from their Uighur peers, where different languages were used in instruction. Some Uighurs chose to attend Han Chinese schools for career benefits. Only since 2005 has bilingual education been introduced in public schools in Xinjiang. Most technical colleges use Chinese in instruction, because of available resources, while colleges for ethnic nationalities instruct in minority languages. Rather than seeing bilingual education as forced assimilation, my relatives see it as a good skill to have in the job market, because many modern-sector jobs will involve interaction with Han Chinese in and out of Xinjiang. For their part, my Xinjiang cousins speak enough Uighur to communicate with Uighurs on a daily basis, and tell me that they live more like Uighurs than Han Chinese, enjoying mutton more than pork. What about widened income gaps between Han Chinese and Uighur Muslims in the market economy? My relatives cite different attitudes toward education, achievement and life. This is where some “racist” assessments may be found, if they may be so-called: nomadic traditions do not value sending kids to schools, but rather roaming around or bathing in the sun; nor do they prioritize professional and material pursuits like the Han Chinese, or hard work or long-term planning for this world, but rather satisfaction in the spiritual world, etc. These are the contrasts I have learned in Western social sciences — conflicts between pre-modern and modern values, religious and secular cultures, or an achievement and non-achievement ethic. So it is hard for me to pass judgment here as well except to urge Han Chinese to loosen up and enjoy life a little as our ethnic brothers do. What about the squeezing of Uighurs in their own native land by growing Han presence? Is that occupation or colonialism? These lines usually shocked my relatives. One aunt, a college professor who spent three decades in Khotan of southern Xinjiang, gave me a history lesson about how Xinjiang came under Chinese control in the Han Dynasty in the 200s B.C. and remained so on and off till the Manchu Dynasty finally consolidated Chinese rule in the 1770s. Xinjiang was loose whenever China was weak internally and its rulers were preoccupied elsewhere. But successive rulers always reasserted control and sovereignty. Another aunt who had lived in a Tibetan region called the Chinese nation a melting pot of different ethnic groups over millenniums. Citing our own ancestors who had migrated to Sichuan generations back, my mother recalls her grandmother as one with white skin and yellow hair, possible of Turkic origin herself from western China. Are there government policies on minority regions responsible for increasing ethnic tensions? Surprisingly (or not so surprisingly for someone familiar with America’s ethnic politics), some of my relatives fault the government’s preferential policies for helping to enhance ethnic identity and entitlement for minorities. Uighurs with disciplinary problems or criminal offenses are treated leniently, they say. In matters of employment, appointment and promotion in the public sector, Uighurs may be preferred over (perceived) more qualified Han candidates. “Reverse discrimination” in college admissions and population policies are other areas of Han complaints. While Han Chinese can have only one child, Uighurs receive honorary and monetary rewards for stopping at three, along with yearly bonuses. Whether legitimate or not, such complaints make it difficult for Han Chinese to appreciate Uighur grievances. Do they think the World Uighur Congress and its exiled leader, Rebiya Radeer, were behind the recent riots? My older relatives from Xinjiang recalled Soviet instigations of Uighur separatism in the 30s and during the cold war, so they said they would not be surprised by any outside support for the W.U.C. or Radeer. Younger relatives point to the U.S. — not the U.S. per se but to the exploitation of U.S. apprehension over anything Beijing does and of U.S. sympathies for any group that Beijing opposes. The real point of staging riots inside China, they assert, is that they enable the exiled groups to survive and thrive. So they expect such riots for years to come.